Abstract. Our input is a bipartite graph G = (R ∪ H, E) where each vertex in R ∪ H has a preference list strictly ranking its neighbors. The vertices in R (similarly, in H) are called residents (resp., hospitals): each resident seeks to be matched to a hospital while each hospital h seeks cap(h) ≥ 1 many residents to be matched to it. The Gale-Shapley algorithm computes a stable matching in G in linear time. We consider the problem of computing a popular matching in Ga matching M is popular if M cannot lose an election to any other matching where vertices cast votes for one matching versus another. Our main contribution is to show that a max-size popular matching in G can be computed by the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm in linear time. This is a simple extension of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm and we prove its correctness via linear programming.
Introduction
We study the one-to-many matching problem, also known as the hospitals/residents problem. Formally, this is given by a set of residents R and a set of hospitals H, where every hospital h has a capacity cap(h) ≥ 1. Every resident seeks to get matched to a hospital and every hospital h seeks to get matched to cap(h) residents. Moreover, every resident r ∈ R has a strict ranking ≻ r over hospitals that are acceptable to r and every hospital h has a strict ranking ≻ h over residents that are acceptable to h. The set of mutually acceptable pairs is given by E ⊆ R×H. Thus our input is a bipartite graph G = (R∪H, E) and the preferences of a vertex are expressed as an ordered list of its neighbors, e.g., u : v, v ′ denotes the preference v ≻ u v ′ , i.e., u prefers v to v ′ .
Definition 1.
A matching M in G = (R ∪ H, E) is a subset of E such that |M (r)| ≤ 1 for each r ∈ R and |M (h)| ≤ cap(h) for each h ∈ H, where M (u) = {v : (u, v) ∈ M }.
3
The goal is to compute an optimal matching in G. The usual definition of optimality in this setting has been stability [22] . A matching M in G is said to be stable if there is no resident-hospital pair (r, h) that "blocks" M . We say a pair (r, h) blocks M if (1) either r is unmatched in M or r prefers h to M (r) and (2) either h has less than cap(h) partners in M or h prefers r to its worst partner in M (h). The Gale-Shapley algorithm can be easily generalized to find a stable matching in G = (R ∪ H, E) as was shown by Gale and Shapley [7] .
Since a stable matching is a maximal matching in G, its size is at least |M max |/2, where M max is a max-size matching in G. This bound can be tight as shown by the following simple example: let R = {r, r ′ } and H = {h, h ′ } where each hospital has capacity 1 and the edge set is E = {(r, h), (r, h ′ ), (r ′ , h)}. The preferences are shown in the table below. Here the only stable matching (red line) is S = {(r, h)}, which is of size 1. However, the max-size matching (dashed lines) is M max = {(r ′ , h), (r, h ′ )}, which is of size 2.
r : h, h It can be shown that all stable matchings have to match the same set of residents and every hospital gets matched to the same capacity in every stable matching. This is popularly called the "Rural Hospitals Theorem" [8, 23] . More precisely, Roth [23] showed that not only is every hospital matched to the same number of residents in every stable matching, but moreover, every hospital that is not matched up to its capacity in some stable matching is actually matched to the same set of residents in any stable matching. Thus the usual notion of stability is very restrictive.
From a social point of view it seems desirable to have a higher number of residents matched to hospitals in order to keep fewer residents unemployed and guarantee sufficient staffing for hospitals. The latter point particularly applies to rural hospitals that oftentimes face the problem of being understaffed with residents by the National Resident Matching Program in the USA (cf. [22, 23] ). A similar point could be made for matching workers to firms or students to seminar seats. This motivates relaxing the notion of "absence of blocking edges" to a weaker notion of stability so as to obtain matchings that are guaranteed to be significantly more than |M max |/2. Note that we do not want to wish to ignore the preferences of vertices and impose a max-size matching on them as such a way of assigning partners will be socially undesirable as it does not take into account the preferences of vertices. Thus we would like to use a notion of optimality that replaces the local stability notion of "no blocking edges" with a weaker notion that is democratic or globally stable and achieves more "global good", i.e., its size is always at least γ · |M max | for some γ > 1/2.
Popularity. Popularity is such a notion. The notion of popularity was introduced by Gärdenfors [9] in the stable marriage problem, i.e., the one-to-one setting (each vertex has capacity 1). Popular matchings have been well-studied here [3, 13, 16, 12, 6, 17] and we generalize them to the hospitals/residents setting now. In the one-to-one setting, given any two matchings M 0 , M 1 in G and a vertex u, we say u prefers
, where we say "M i (u) = null" if u is left unmatched in matching M i , for i = 0, 1 -note that the null option is the least preferred state for any vertex u in a matching. We will use the function vote u (v, v ′ ) for any vertex u and neighbors v, v ′ of u that is defined as follows:
where as before, we adopt the convention that "M i (r) = null" for a resident r left unmatched in M i , for i = 0, 1. We would now like to define ∆ h (M 0 , M 1 ) for a hospital h. If h is not matched up to its capacity in M i , we will say "M i (h) = null" with multiplicity equal to cap(h) − |M i (h)| and the null state is the least preferred state for h.
Voting by hospitals. When we compare the preference of a hospital h with cap(h) = 3 for S 0 = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } versus S 1 = {r 4 , r 5 , r 6 } (where r i is the i-th ranked resident in h's preference list), we would like h's vote to capture the fact that h is better-off by 3 residents in S 0 when compared to S 1 . So while comparing one matching versus another, we allow a hospital to cast more than one vote. Let h be any hospital and let S 0 , S 1 be any subsets of the set of h's neighbors where we add some occurrences of "null" to make S 0 , S 1 sets of size cap(h). We will view the sets S ′ 0 = S 0 \ S 1 and S
The preference of hospital h for S 0 versus S 1 , denoted by δ h (S 0 , S 1 ), is defined as follows:
where
are being compared in the order that is most adversarial or negative for M 0 . That is, this order σ ∈ Π[k] of comparison between elements of S ′ 0 and S ′ 1 gives the least value for n + − n − , where n + is the number of indices i such that
For instance, when a hospital h with cap(h) = 3 compares two subsets S 0 = {r 1 , r 3 , r 5 } and S 1 = {r 2 , r 4 , r 6 } (where r i is the i-th ranked resident in h's preference list), we have δ h (S 0 , S 1 ) = −1 since comparing the following pairs results in the least value of δ h (S 0 , S 1 ): this pairing is (r 1 with r 6 ), (r 3 with r 2 ), (r 5 with r 4 ). This makes δ h (S 0 , S 1 ) = 1 − 1 − 1 = −1. While computing δ h (S 1 , S 0 ), the pairing would be (r 2 with r 1 ), (r 4 with r 3 ), (r 6 with r 5 ): then δ h (S 1 , S 0 ) = −1 − 1 − 1 = −3.
For any two matchings M 0 and M 1 in G, we compare them using the function
We say M 0 is at least as popular as
-when we sum up the total number of votes cast by all hospitals and residents, the votes for M 1 can never outnumber the votes for M 0 .
Thus for a matching M 0 to be popular, it means that M 0 is at least as popular as every matching in G, i.e., there is no matching M 1 such that ∆(M 0 , M 1 ) < 0. If there exists a matching M 1 such that ∆(M 0 , M 1 ) < 0 then this is taken as a certificate of unpopularity of M 0 . It is not obvious whether popular matchings always exist in G.
Our definition of popularity may seem too strict and restrictive since for each hospital h, we choose the most negative or adversarial ordering for
. A more relaxed definition may be to order the sets 
Thus M 0 is a weakly popular matching if the sum of votes for M 0 is at least the sum of votes for any matching
in the ordering that is most favorable for M 0 . Thus "weak popularity" is a more relaxed notion than "popularity" and a max-size weakly popular matching could presumably be larger than a max-size popular matching.
Our results. We will show that every stable matching in G = (R ∪ H, E) is popular, thus our definition of popularity is a relaxation of stability. This also shows that popular matchings always exist. We will present a simple linear time algorithm for computing a max-size popular matching M 0 in G and show
We also show that M 0 is more popular than every larger matching, i.e., ∆(M 0 , M 1 ) > 0 for any matching M 1 that is larger than M 0 . Thus M 0 is also a max-size weakly popular matching in G as no matching M 1 larger than M 0 can be weakly popular due to the fact that ∆(M 0 , M 1 ) > 0.
Akin to the rural hospitals theorem, we show that all max-size popular matchings have to match the same set of residents and every hospital gets matched to the same capacity in every max-size popular matching. However every hospital that is not matched up to its capacity in some max-size popular matching does not need to be matched to the same set of residents in any max-size popular matching, which is in contrast to stable matchings [23] .
Techniques. Our algorithm is an adaptation of the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm from [16] that finds a max-size popular matching in a stable marriage instance. Our main contribution here is to show that this algorithm computes a max-size popular matching in the hospitals/residents setting as well. While the analysis of the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm in [16] is based on a structural characterization of popular matchings (from [13] ) on forbidden alternating paths and alternating cycles, we will use linear programming to show the correctness of this algorithm here.
Our linear programming techniques are based on a linear program that was used in [18] to find a popular fractional matching in a bipartite graph with 1-sided preference lists. The popular fractional matching polytope shown in [18] was also used in [17] to show the popularity of some half-integral matchings in the stable marriage problem. We do not design a popular fractional matching polytope for the hospitals/residents problem -instead we focus on the matching M 0 obtained via the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm and use linear programming on a certain weighted graph G ′ M0 that we build here.
Background and related work. The first algorithmic question studied in popular matchings was in the domain of 1-sided preference lists [1] where it is only vertices on the left, who are agents, that have preferences; the vertices on the right are objects and they have no preferences. Popular matchings need not always exist here, however fractional matchings that are popular always exist and can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming [18] .
Popular matchings always exist in any instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists since every stable matching is popular [9] . Efficient algorithms to find a max-size popular matching in a stable marriage instance are known [13, 16] and a subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings was studied in [6] . While a max-size popular matching can be easily computed here, there is no polynomial time algorithm currently known for computing a min-cost popular matching when there is a cost function on the edge set. A polynomial time algorithm was shown in [17] to find a min-cost popular half-integral matching. When preference lists admit ties, the problem of determining if the given instance admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard [3, 5] .
The stable matching problem in a marriage instance has been extensively studied -we refer to the books [10, 19] on this topic. The problem of computing stable matchings or its variants in the hospitals/residents setting is also well-studied [2, 11, 14, 15] . The stable matching algorithm in the hospitals/residents problem has several real-world applications -it is used to match residents to hospitals in Canada [4] and in the USA [21].
Our algorithm
In this section we describe the "2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm" (earlier used in [16] ) to compute a maxsize popular matching in G = (R ∪ H, E). This algorithm works in the graph G ′ = (R ′ ∪ H, E ′ ) defined as follows: R ′ consists of two copies r 0 and r 1 of every resident r in R, i.e., R ′ = {r 0 , r 1 : r ∈ R}. The set H of hospitals in G ′ is the same as in G and the edge set here is E ′ = {(r 0 , h), (r 1 , h) : (r, h) ∈ E}. The preference list of r i (for i = 0, 1) is exactly the same as the preference list of r. The elements in the set {r i : r ∈ R} will be called level i residents, for i = 0, 1. Every h ∈ H prefers any level 1 neighbor to a level 0 neighbor: within the set of level i neighbors (for i = 0, 1), h's preference order is the same as its original preference order. For instance, if a hospital h has only 2 neighbors r and r ′ in G where r ≻ h r ′ , the preference order of h in G ′ is:
. At any point in time, only one of r 0 and r 1 will be active in our algorithm. To begin with, all level 0 residents are active in our algorithm and all level 1 residents are inactive. We keep a queue Q of all the active residents and they propose as in Gale-Shapley algorithm:
-every active unmatched resident r i who has neighbors in G ′ proposes to its most preferred neighbor in G ′ -in case r 0 has no neighbors in G ′ , then r 0 becomes inactive and r 1 becomes active and it joins the queue Q.
2. while Q = ∅ do 3. delete the first vertex from Q: call it r i . 4. if r i has one or more neighbors in G ′ then 5.
-let h be the most preferred neighbor of
if h is matched to more than cap(h) neighbors in M then 7.
-let r
-delete the edge (r
if h is matched to cap(h) many neighbors in M then 11.
-delete all edges (s k , h) from G ′ where s k is a neighbor in G ′ that is ranked worse than h's worst partner in M . {this is again according to preferences in G ′ } 12.
end if 13. else if i = 0 then 14.
-add r 1 to Q. {r 0 has no neighbors in G ′ and so r 1 gets activated } 15. end if 16. end while 17. Return the matching M .
When a hospital h receives a proposal from r i , the hospital h accepts this offer. If h is now matched to more than cap(h) partners then h rejects its worst partner r ′ j in the current matching and so r ′ j will have to find a new partner now and it joins Q.
If h is now matched to cap(h) partners then we delete all edges (s k , h) from G ′ where s k is a neighbor in G ′ that is ranked worse than h's worst partner in the current matching -so no such resident s k can propose to h later on in the algorithm. Once Q becomes empty, the algorithm terminates. A description of our algorithm is given as Algorithm 1.
Let M be the matching returned by this algorithm and let M 0 be the matching in G that is obtained by projecting M to the edge set of G, i.e., (r i , h) ❀ (r, h) for every edge (r i , h) in M , where i ∈ {0, 1}. We will prove that M 0 is a max-size popular matching in Section 3.
The correctness of our algorithm
In this section we show a sufficient condition for a matching N in G to be popular. This is shown via a graph called G ′ N : this is a bipartite graph constructed using N such that N gets mapped to a simple matching
Thus for any edge e = (r, h) / ∈ N , there are cap(h) many copies of e in G ′ : these are (r, The purpose of the vertex ℓ(u) is to capture the state of u being left unmatched in any matching so that every matching in G gets mapped to an (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching in G ′ N , i.e., one that matches all vertices in R ∪ H ′ . We will use these last resort neighbors to obtain an (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching
Thus every resident r unmatched in N gets matched to ℓ(r) in N * and if a hospital h was not fully matched in N , then some h i 's will be matched to their last resort neighbors in N * . We now define edge weights in G ′ N .
-For any edge e = (r, h i ) ∈ R × H ′ : the weight of edge e is wt N (e) = vote r (h, N (r)) + vote h (r, N ′ (h i )). Note that for each edge e ∈ R × H ′ , we have wt N (e) ∈ {±2, 0} and wt N (e) = 2 if and only if e blocks N .
-For any edge e = (u, ℓ(u)): the weight of edge e is wt N (e) = vote u (ℓ(u), N * (u)). Thus wt N (u, ℓ(u)) = −1 if u was matched in N ′ and wt N (u, ℓ(u)) = 0 otherwise (in which case N * (u) = ℓ(u)).
Observe that every edge e ∈ N * satisfies wt N (e) = 0. Thus the weight of the matching N * in G ′ N is 0. We will show in Theorem 1 that if every (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching in the graph G ′ N has weight at most 0, then N is a popular matching in G. We will show later that the matching M 0 obtained from our algorithm satisfies this condition.
A sufficient condition for popularity
The following theorem shows a sufficient condition for a matching N to be popular in G. 
and T * will also have some appropriate (u, ℓ(u)) edges.
(i) For every edge (r, h) ∈ N ∩ T do: set T * (r) = N * (r); thus if (r, h j ) ∈ N * then (r, h j ) belongs to T * as well. (ii) For every r that is matched in T and T (r) = N (r), we have to decide the index k such that T * (r) = h k where T (r) = h. In the evaluation of ∆ h (N, T ), while comparing the sets N (h)\T (h) and T (h)\N (h):
-let r ′ ∈ N (h) be the resident that h compares r with. So the matching N * contains the edge (r ′ , h j ) for some j. Set T * (r) = h j . -if r is compared with "null" by h (so h is not fully matched in N ), then we set T * (r) = h j for some j such that (h j , ℓ(h j )) ∈ N * and h j is unmatched so far in
It is easy to see that T * is a valid matching in G ′ N and it matches all vertices in R ∪ H ′ . We will now show that wt N (T * ) > 0. We have wt N (T * ) = e∈T * wt N (e).
We have wt N (r, h i ) = vote r (h, N (r)) + vote h (r, N * (h i )) from the definition of edge weights in G ′ N . By grouping together for each h, the edges (r, h i ) for all r ∈ T (h) and any possible (ℓ(h i ), h i ) edges, we get the right side of Eqn. (3). Crucially, Eqn. (4) follows from how we constructed the matching T * : for each hospital h,
The total sum of all the terms ∆ u (N, T ) for u ∈ R ∪ H is ∆(N, T ). Since ∆(N, T ) < 0, it follows that the weight of T * is positive. Thus there is a matching with positive weight in G ′ N that matches all vertices in R ∪ H ′ . This contradicts the fact that every (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching in G ′ N has weight at most 0. Hence N is a popular matching.
⊓ ⊔
We now apply the above theorem to show that every stable matching in G is also a popular matching.
Corollary 1. Every stable matching in G is popular.
Proof. Let S be any stable matching in G. Consider the graph G ′ S : since S has no blocking edge in G, it follows that every edge e in G ′ S satisfies wt S (e) ≤ 0. Thus every matching in G ′ S has weight at most 0 and so by Theorem 1, we can conclude that S is popular. ⊓ ⊔
The popularity of M 0
We will now use Theorem 1 to prove the popularity of the matching M 0 computed in Section 2. We will construct the matchings M 
Recall that M ⊆ R
′ × H is the matching in the graph G ′ obtained at the end of the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Algorithm 1) and the projection of M on to R × H is M 0 .
The definition of the sets 
Theorem 2 will show that the matching M 0 satisfies the condition of Theorem 1 and this will imply that M 0 is a popular matching in G. This proof is inspired by the proof in [17] that shows the membership of certain half-integral matchings in the popular fractional matching polytope of a stable marriage instance. . We want to show that the primal optimal value is at most 0. We will do this by showing a dual feasible solution with value 0. The primal LP is the following:
where E ′ (u) is the set of edges incident on u in G ′ M0 . The dual LP is the following: we associate a variable α u to each vertex u ∈ R ∪ H ′ .
Consider the following assignment of α u -values for all u ∈ R ∪ H ′ : set α u = 0 for all u unmatched in M 
Observe that Inequality (7) holds for all vertices u ∈ R ∪ H ′ . This is because α u = 0 = wt M0 (u, ℓ(u)) for all u unmatched in M ′ 0 ; similarly, for all u matched in M ′ 0 we have α u ≥ −1 = wt M0 (u, ℓ(u)). In order to show Inequality (6), we will use Claim 1 stated below (its proof is given after the proof of Theorem 2).
-Claim 1 (i) states that for every edge (r,
Since wt M0 (e) ≤ 2 for all edges e in G ′ M0 and we set α u = 1 for all vertices u ∈ R 0 ∪ H 
The resident r 0 was rejected by all its neighbors (including h) and became inactive. When h rejected r 0 , the hospital h was matched to cap(h) neighbors, each of which was preferred by h to r 0 . Thereafter, h may have received (and accepted) better offers from its neighbors and since h i ∈ H ′ 0 , the hospital h never received enough offers from level 1 neighbors to have all its partners as level 1 residents. In particular, h i is matched to a level 0 neighbor that is preferred to r 0 . Thus h i prefers its neighbor in
We will now show part (ii) of this lemma. In our algorithm, the preference order of each hospital h, when restricted to level 0 neighbors, is its original preference order and similarly, its preference order when restricted to level 1 neighbors, is its original preference order. Thus for each edge (r,
In both cases, we have wt M0 (r, h i ) ≤ 0. ⊓ ⊔
Maximality of the popular matching M 0
We need to show that M 0 is a max-size popular matching in G and we now show that this follows quite easily from the proof of Theorem 2. Let T be any matching in G. We can obtain a realization T * of the matching T in G ′ M0 that is absolutely analogous to how it was done in steps (i)-(iii) in the proof of Theorem 1. Thus T * is an (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching in G ′ M0 and wt M0 (T * ) = −∆(M 0 , T ). We know from Theorem 2 that wt M0 (T * ) ≤ 0. Suppose T is a popular matching in G. Then wt M0 (T * ) has to be 0, otherwise the popularity of T is contradicted since wt M0 (T * ) < 0 implies that
* is an optimal solution to the maximum weight (R ∪ H ′ )-complete matching problem in G ′ M0 . Recall that this is the primal LP in the proof of Theorem 2. We will use complementary slackness to prove the following lemma. Lemma 1. Let T be a popular matching in G and let T * be the realization of
Proof. Consider the α-values assigned to vertices in R ∪ H ′ in the proof of Theorem 2. This is an optimal dual solution since its value is 0 which is the value of the optimal primal solution. Thus complementary slackness conditions have to hold for each edge in the optimal solution (T * e ) e∈G ′ M 0 to the primal LP. That is, for each edge (a, b) ∈ G ′ M0 , we have:
If u is a resident, then u ∈ R 1 ; observe that all of u's neighbors are in H ′ 1 -otherwise u would propose to its neighbor in H ′ 0 who would accept its offer since any level 1 resident is preferred to its current partner (who is a level 0 resident). Similarly, if u is a hospital, then u ∈ H ′ 0 and all its neighbors are in R 0 ; otherwise u would be adjacent to some resident r ′ ∈ R 1 and u (being unmatched) would have accepted r ′ 0 's proposal and r ′ 1 would never have been activated in the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm.
In both cases every edge (u,
Thus it follows from Equation (8) 
Now it is immediate to see that M 0 is a max-size popular matching in G. Let T be any popular matching in G. Consider the matching
As this holds for any popular matching T in G, we can conclude that M 0 is a max-size popular matching in G.
It is known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the hospitals/residents problem can be implemented to run in linear time [20] . Hence the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm also runs in linear time and we can conclude the following theorem. Lemma 2 below shows that any matching T larger than M 0 cannot be weakly popular (see Definition 3) as ∆(M 0 , T ) > 0 for such a matching. This implies that M 0 is also a max-size weakly popular matching in G.
Lemma 2. If T is a matching such that
Proof. If T is a larger matching than M 0 , then some vertices left unmatched in M 0 have to be matched in T . Thus for some u ∈ R ∪ H ′ such that (u, ℓ(u)) ∈ M * 0 , the matching T * contains an edge (u, v) where v = ℓ(u). Thus T * contains a slack edge (u, v) ∈ R × H ′ since α u = 0, α v = 1 while wt M0 (u, v) = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1).
It now follows from Equation (8) that T * cannot be an optimal solution to the maximum weight
Remark. The above result implies that the following interesting property: for any definition of popularity that is "in between" popularity and weak popularity, the size of a max-size popular matching is the same. To formalize the meaning of "in between", consider the two relations on assignments p and wp , where
induced by popularity and weak popularity, respectively. Clearly, p ⊆ wp . Note that popular matchings and weakly popular matchings correspond to maximal elements of p and wp , respectively. 4 Our result that M 0 is also a max-size maximal element of wp implies that if is a relation on matchings (induced by an alternative notion of popularity) such that p ⊆ ⊆ wp , then M 0 is also a max-size maximal element of . Hence we can conclude the following proposition which even allows for different hospitals to compare sets of residents in different ways. 
The rural hospitals theorem for max-size popular matchings
The rural hospitals theorem for stable matchings [23] does not necessarily hold for max-size popular matchings. That is, a hospital that is not matched up to capacity in some max-size popular matching is not necessarily matched to the same set of residents in every max-size popular matching.
Consider the instance G = (R ∪ H, E) with R = {r, r ′ } and H = {h, h ′ } and cap(h) = 1 and cap(h ′ ) = 2. The edge set is R × H. The preferences are shown in the table below. The (max-size) popular matchings are M = {(r, h), (r ′ , h ′ )} (in black) and M ′ = {(r, h ′ ), (r ′ , h)} (in red). So h ′ is matched to a different resident in the two max-size popular matchings M and M ′ . Note that M ′ is not stable, as (r, h) is a blocking pair.
However Lemma 3 holds here. Such a result for max-size popular matchings in the one-to-one setting was shown in [12] . Our proof is based on linear programming and is different from the combinatorial proof in [12] . Proof. Consider the realization
Since T is popular, we know that T * has to include all the edges (u, ℓ(u)) for 
Other interesting properties
We show a non-trivial lower bound on the size of a max-size popular matching in G in Lemma 4. This proof is based on an analogous proof in [16] which shows such a result in the one-to-one setting. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 5 below states that a stable matching is a min-size popular matching in G. Such a result in the one-to-one setting was shown in [13] and our proof is inspired by their proof. In fact, the proof of Lemma 5 will show that a stable matching is a min-size weakly popular matching in G. Proof. Let T be a matching in G such that |T | < |S|. Consider a realization T * of the matching T in the graph G ′ S as described in the proof of Theorem 1 such that T * is (R ∪ H ′ )-complete and wt S (T * ) = −∆(S, T ). Recall that S is a stable matching in G -hence for each edge e in G ′ S , we have wt S (e) ≤ 0. Moreover, because |T | < |S|, there is a resident r that is matched to a genuine neighbor in S, however T * contains the edge e = (r, ℓ(r)). We have wt S (e) = −1. Thus wt S (T * ) < 0. In other words, ∆(S, T ) > 0 and T is unpopular. Since S is a popular matching in G, it means that S is a min-size popular matching in G.
⊓ ⊔
We would like to remark that the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm and our analysis extend to the manyto-many setting as well. Here every vertex u in the instance G = (A ∪ B, E) has a capacity cap(u) ≥ 1 associated with it and seeks cap(u) many partners in a matching. Thus a max-size popular matching in such an instance can also be computed in linear time.
